



O’Connor, A. (2001). Poverty knowledge: Social science, social policy, and the poor in 
twentieth-century U. S. history. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Reviewed by Peter Kindle, Doctoral Candidate, LMSW 
University of Houston 
In less than 300 pages of text, Alice O’Connor, currently associate professor of history at 
the University of California at Santa Barbara, unveils how knowledge is constructed and how, 
once constructed, knowledge can become fodder for ideology and political manipulation. Thus 
used (or abused), knowledge shapes both the institutions (i.e., policies, procedures, eligibility 
standards) and the broader cultural meanings associated with the concept of poverty.  
Her central premise, written self-consciously in the frustrating (to liberals) period 
following the end of welfare promised in the 1994 Clinton welfare reform, is that future solutions 
to the problem of poverty are contingent upon “a redirection in contemporary social scientific 
poverty knowledge” (p. 4). Yet this volume does not contain a detailed blueprint for a future 
research agenda. In fact, she claims that “reconstructing poverty knowledge is more than simply 
a matter of generating new research questions for social scientists to pursue” (p. 8). What 
O’Connor is attempting to do is to awaken in her readers a deeper understanding of how 
knowledge is socially constructed. Her history of poverty knowledge becomes, then, a kind of 
case study or primer on how social scientists who desire to make a contemporary impact on 
social policy need to reflectively process the institutional, societal, and cultural import of their 
work.  
The first section, from the Progressive Era in chapter one to the antecedents of Kennedy/
Johnson’s War on Poverty in chapter five, anchors 20th century poverty knowledge in reactions to 
the natural law defense of Social Darwinism and the moralism of relief agencies. This poverty 
knowledge was intentionally quantitative and focused on collecting objective social facts, not 
individual moral failings. The dominant paradigm for poverty knowledge became Chicago’s 
social ecology that understood poverty to be the natural consequence of the cultural 
disorganization accompanying immigration with an anticipated terminus in future assimilation; 
however, cultural disorganization was understood to be a treatable symptom rather than a causal 
contributor to poverty. Poverty knowledge was purposive, directed at structural, economic, and 
labor reform to produce more egalitarian distributions of wealth and power.  
The collapse of the economy in the 1930s resulted in a subtle change in the focus of 
poverty knowledge (chapter two). In this phase, immigrant deviant cultural patterns in the north 
and cultural (i.e., racial) pathologies in the south were perceived to be determinative of working 
class poverty. Further, as African Americans migrated north during the 1940s, the racial barriers 
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to black assimilation became more apparent (chapter three). Gunnar Myrdal’s An American 
Dilemma (1944) set the framework for the racialization of poverty with black Americans 
relegated to a lower caste-like status reinforced by white racism. The economic prosperity of the 
post-war years, Cold War competition for influence in poor third world nations, the behavioral 
science explosion, and idealization of the (new) nuclear family created the context for 
development of the idea of a culture of poverty (chapter four). Poverty knowledge was now 
relegated to a list of behavioral and psychological traits rooted in dysfunctional family patterns 
sustaining pockets of poverty. The “isolated, maladjusted, and politically passive” poor “needed 
the galvanizing force of outside intervention to break what had become an internalized ‘vicious 
circle’” (p. 123).  
Chapter five is a short parenthetical insert laying the background of experimental 
community action programs – a pattern that took on a temporary but highly important role in 
Kennedy/Johnson’s War on Poverty. 
In the second section, the War on Poverty made a significant impact on poverty 
knowledge (chapter six through eight). Chapter six deals with the broad political issues related to 
poverty knowledge; chapter seven in more detail with the Office of Economic Opportunity 
(OEO); and chapter eight with the academic consideration of the Culture Wars.  It was during the 
decade of the 1960s that poverty became identified, for the first time, as a distinct social problem 
that required specific government action. Targeted first through an economic growth initiative, 
then through consideration of economic restructuring and income distribution, and finally 
settling on community action programs, the War on Poverty in O’Connor’s hands becomes a 
case study of how political considerations and scientific research interact to produce conflicting 
and ineffective policy decisions. By the end of the 1960s, poverty had been objectified as 
inadequate income, the culture of poverty had morphed into discussions of human capital 
deficits, and poverty issues were no longer coupled in policy and political discourse with issues 
of race or economic structural inequities. Poverty knowledge, under OEO auspices became 
specialized, individualized, and statistical. Academic researchers did not completely forsake 
racial and structural considerations; however, academic research was largely severed from 
reform initiatives, and the techniques of quantitative poverty research focused on individual 
human capital deficits had much in common with the earlier culture of poverty. In conservative 
hands, the research and techniques developed to understand and prevent poverty were redirected, 
in the third section of the book, against welfare rather than against poverty. 
Chapter nine, the beginning of the last section of the book, chronicles the poverty 
research industry spawned by the War on Poverty. Poverty research from 1965 to 1980 grew 
from $3 million to $200 million annually. Poverty knowledge was again changed as a result of 
federal funding. The questions raised by federal funding agencies were narrow, not expansive, 
and focused on the identification of the human capital deficits of the poor and on measurement of 
the effectiveness and efficiency of government income support programs. Even high 
unemployment and chronic inflation in the 1970s did not result in challenges to the dominant 
market-centered worldview or existing structural inequities. In the 1980s, the problem of poverty 
was reinterpreted as a problem of dependency. Liberal analysts advocating structural changes to 
enhance opportunity and erode dependency provided the data and frameworks later used by 
conservative analysts to attack welfare itself. The problem was no longer poverty; the problem 
had become welfare dependency. Chapter eleven traces the end of welfare and presents an 
outline of what poverty knowledge must become to address alleviation of poverty rather than 
reduction of the number on welfare rolls. This brief four page section basically calls for 
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redefinition of poverty knowledge as analysis of the political economy and the related structural 
impediments to economic opportunity.  
This ending is clearly the greatest weakness of Poverty Knowledge. If political decisions 
are only rarely a product of rational analysis, as O’Connor has so compelling shown, then the 
challenge for liberal/progressive researchers is to understand the contemporary political Zeitgeist 
in which poverty knowledge is embedded. The recent inauguration of the Obama administration 
signaled a distinct repudiation of the conservative perspective that has dominated poverty 
knowledge since the 1970s. This perspective, rooted in understanding poverty as a specialized 
domain in which individual characteristics are the most significant factors, has impeded 
consideration of institutional and structural obstacles to poverty alleviation. Progressive and 
liberal researchers and policy analysts may be facing a time when executive attention can be 
refocused away from individual deficits to modification of social, structural, and institutional 
factors that create bridges of opportunity through which the poor might crossover to middle class 
stability. 
What is needed is an understanding of how progressive poverty research can best impact 
the existing political discourse. It is unfortunate that O’Connor provides so little of this guidance 
considering the wealth of historical background of which she displays so much mastery. 
However, one need not be a historian to notice that political and policy discourse has become 
dominated by the constructs and vocabulary of economics. Social workers in practice and 
academe who hope to impact poverty knowledge may well consider the investment of time and 
energy to master the art of expressing the systems analyses to which we are accustomed in the 
thought forms and categories of the economist. Even Obama’s opportunity-directed approach is 
most likely to be persuaded by innovative system analyses that identify structural barriers and 
propose new openings to economic advance. There seems little reason why the social work 
community should not take an active lead in generating a new systems understanding of poverty 
knowledge. 
